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We analyze the effect of external financing concerns on managers’ financial reporting behavior
prior to management buyouts (MBOs). Prior studies hypothesize that managers intending to
undertake an MBO have an incentive to manage earnings downward to reduce the purchase price.
We hypothesize that managers also face a conflicting reporting incentive associated with their
efforts to obtain external financing for the MBO and to lower their financing cost. Consistent
with our hypothesis, we find that managers who rely the most on external funds to finance their
MBOs tend to report less negative abnormal accruals prior to the MBOs. In addition, the relation
between external financing and abnormal accruals is tempered when there are more fixed assets
that can serve as collateral for debt financing.
Keywords: MBO, earnings management, debt financing, managerial incentives
_____________________________________________________________________________________
1. Introduction
Prior studies suggest that firms manage earnings prior to corporate events such as: MBOs (Perry
and Williams 1994), seasoned public offerings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998; Shivakumar 2000), stockfor-stock mergers (Erickson and Wang 1999; Louis 2004), reverse leverage buyouts (Chou, Gombola, and
Liu 2006), open-market repurchases (Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008), and Dutch-auction tender offers (Louis
and White 2007). These studies generally focus on managers’ incentives to use reporting discretion to
influence equity market investors. There is little consideration in the literature, however, to the presence
of reporting incentives that conflict with the incentives to influence equity market investors.
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We analyze the effect of external financing considerations on managers’ financial reporting
behavior prior to management buyouts (MBOs). Our interest in MBOs is heightened by the resurgence in
MBO activities starting with the late 1990s and managers’ renewed interest in MBOs due partly to the
desire to avoid the compliance costs associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Engel, Hayes, and Wang
2007). We are also interested in the MBO setting because extant studies on earnings management prior to
MBOs yield mixed results. DeAngelo (1986) finds no evidence of earnings management prior to MBOs
whereas Perry and Williams (1994) report evidence consistent with downward earnings management. By
controlling for external financing incentives, we may be able to provide clearer evidence that managers
respond to equity market incentives. Nonetheless, our main motivation for choosing the MBO setting is
the potential conflicting financial reporting incentive associated with external financing considerations.
Managers planning to undertake an MBO want to purchase their firms’ equity at as low a price as
possible. Consequently, previous studies hypothesize that managers have an incentive to release less
favorable earnings reports to equity market participants prior to an MBO in an attempt to reduce the MBO
purchase price (e.g., Perry and Williams 1994). We consider the possibility that managers have a
conflicting earnings management incentive prior to MBOs that is attributable to external financing
concerns, which are thought to be substantial (see, e.g., Osborn 1984; Kosman 1998; Tran 2000). In the
framework we employ for our analysis, the financing related reporting incentive is driven by
management’s concerns regarding their ability to obtain MBO financing from external parties and their
desire to obtain that financing at a favorable cost. The financing incentive conflicts with the equity market
incentive because the financing incentive suggests that managers should manage earnings upward.
Consequently, to the extent that an external financing incentive exists, we expect it to temper the equity
market incentive. Based upon our framework, we hypothesize that financing related earnings management
incentives are more pronounced when the funds needed to execute the buyout must be raised to a greater
extent from external parties. In addition, we hypothesize that the increase in financing related incentives
arising from increased external financing is greater when there are fewer fixed assets available to secure
loans. We find evidence consistent with both hypotheses.
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The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
financing of MBOs. Section 3 discusses managers’ conflicting reporting incentives prior to MBOs and
formulates our hypotheses. Section 4 describes our earnings management proxy. Section 5 describes the
sample selection process and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 6 reports univariate results on
earnings management prior to MBOs and the correlation between earnings management and the source of
the MBO financing. Section 7 reports multivariate regression results on the association between earnings
management and external financing. The study concludes in Section 8.
2. Financing of management buyouts
Management buyouts are a form of leveraged buyout in which the management team is part of the
investment group buying the firm. Other members of the investment group may be a buyout specialist or
an investment bank. The investment group may finance the transaction through internal sources. In most
cases, however, MBO firms obtain additional financing from external sources by leveraging the
company’s assets through secured bank loans that may be syndicated. In addition, further external debt
financing may be attained through private placements of subordinated claims with institutions such as
pension funds, insurance companies, or venture capital firms or through public offerings of “high yield”
or “junk” bonds. After raising the cash required to implement the buyout, the investment group purchases
the firm via a merger or a tender offer. See Weston, Chung, and Siu (1997, pp. 316-343) for more details.
While MBOs are generally financed through debt from external sources, internal financing can be
substantial. According to statistics from Portfolio Management Data, the percentage of equity invested by
buyout firms was 31.6% in 1998 and 37% in 1999 (Tran 2000). In fact, some MBOs are financed entirely
through internal funds. For instance, Ecometry Corporation states in its Schedule 14A filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): “The total amount of cash required to consummate the SG
Merger is estimated to be approximately $23 million, all of which will be paid by the surviving
corporation from the cash that we currently have on hand.” As another example, PartsBase states in its
filing: “The Acquisition Group, through the cash reserves of PRTS which will become available
immediately upon the effectiveness of the merger, has sufficient funds available to pay the merger
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consideration and pay its portion of the fees and expenses incurred in connection with the merger. The
merger is not conditioned on any financing arrangements.” In summary, there appears to be some
significant variation in the funding sources for MBOs, which is critical for our analysis.
3. Conflicting reporting incentives prior to management buyouts
Extant literature on earnings management suggests that managers have incentives to manage
earnings downward prior to a buyout in order to reduce the purchase price (see, for example, DeAngelo
1986; and Perry and Williams 1994). We argue that external financing concerns could mitigate, but not
necessarily dominate, these incentives to manage earnings downward. As has been discussed in prior
studies, the economic rents arising from MBOs can be quite substantial.1 While MBOs can provide ample
benefits to the buyout group, securing the debt financing to execute them is often difficult (see Osborn
1984; Nelson 1985; Buccino 1989; Kosman 1998; and Tran 2000). Thus, at the margin, managers could
be dissuaded from managing earnings down to secure a lower equity purchase price, which increases
economic rents, because it could jeopardize their ability to obtain the financing needed to capture those
rents and adversely alter the terms at which the financing is obtained. Hence, on average, managers who
rely the most on external sources of financing are likely to deflate earnings prior to MBOs to a lesser
extent than those who rely the most on internal sources of financing.
3.1 Illustrative model
To further develop our intuition, we analyze a stylized equilibrium model of financial reporting
prior to an MBO where we assume the manager’s objective is to manage earnings to minimize total costs,
which have three components: the MBO purchase price, the incremental cost of external financing for the
MBO, and the reporting cost. Consider a setting where a manager, who anticipates an MBO, prepares an

1

These benefits include: tax benefits (Kaplan 1989); mitigation of agency costs (Jensen, 1986), stronger managerial

incentives under private ownership (DeAngelo et al. 1984); savings of registration, listing, and shareholder servicing
costs (DeAngelo et al. 1984); expropriation of bondholders (Masulis 1980); and avoidance of compliance costs
associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2007).
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earnings report, r, for his firm. The manager can engage in earnings management that is not observed by
external parties so the report satisfies r = e + m, where e is unmanaged earnings and m is the level of
earnings management (i.e., m > 0 is upward earnings management and m < 0 is downward earnings
management). If the manager engages in earnings management, he expects to incur some legal or
λ

regulatory costs equal to 2rm2, where λr > 0. Consistent with prior earnings management studies, we use a
quadratic cost function because it permits a simple closed-form equilibrium characterization of the
manager’s earnings management strategy (See Fischer and Verrecchia 2000; or Dye and Sridhar 2004).
To execute the MBO, the manager must have funds to purchase the equity he does not already
own and pay for existing senior claims that must be settled. Let P be the funds required to execute the
^ e), where α > 0 represents the payment required to settle senior claims
MBO. We assume P = α + λe(r – m
plus any intercept term in a linear pricing function for outstanding equity, λe represents the sensitivity of
^ e is
the equity market price to equity market participant beliefs about unmanaged earnings, λe > 0, and m
the equity market participants’ beliefs about the manager’s earnings management choice. Hence, the
linear function captures the idea that the equity price is an increasing linear function of the market beliefs
about unmanaged earnings, which are increasing in the report and decreasing in the market beliefs about
the manager’s earnings management.
The manager expects to raise f ≥ 0 funds from external sources, with the remaining funds coming
from the MBO group, which includes the manager. The incremental cost of the externally raised funds is
a decreasing function of the manager’s earnings report, where the sensitivity of the cost to the earnings
report is decreasing in the level of the target firm’s fixed assets, a, that can be employed as collateral.
^ f)], where αf > 0,
Formally, the incremental cost per unit of the external financing, R, is [αf – λf(a)(r – m
^ f is the external financing market beliefs about the extent of earnings
λf(a) > 0, λf'(a) < 0, and m
management. This function implies that the manager can obtain financing at more favorable rates if the
external financiers believe economic earnings are higher. We assume that the external financing cost is
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less sensitive to beliefs about economic earnings when there are more fixed assets to serve as collateral
because the additional collateral makes the financiers’ debt claims less reliant on future earnings flows for
payment. Given the structure of the model, the manager’s reporting objective is to choose m to minimize
the cost function
P + Rf +

λr 2
^ e)] + [αf – λf(a)(r – m
^ f)]f + λrm2.
m = [α + λe(r – m
2
2

(1)

As an aside, we should note that our model specification does not explicitly include a notion of credit
rationing, which is often referred to as a barrier for executing an MBO. We could implicitly build this
notion into the manager’s objective function by assuming that the incremental cost of external financing
can be so large as to make the MBO infeasible.
A crucial assumption required for the development of our hypothesis is that the manager believes
that neither the equity market participants nor the external financiers observe his actual earnings
management choice. Consequently, the manager treats the equity market participant and financer’s beliefs
^ e and m
^ f respectively, as being unaffected by his actual choice. It
regarding his earnings management, m
follows that, even if the manager’s earnings management activities are perfectly anticipated, the manager
still engages in earnings management because he would be worse off not managing earnings.2
The quadratic nature of the cost function implies that the optimal choice of m is finite and
satisfies the necessary first order condition, which can be expressed as:
λe – λf(a)f + λrm = 0.

(2)

The first term, λe, captures the benefit of a marginal increase in downward earnings management arising
from its influence on the beliefs of equity market participants, while the second term, λf(a)f, captures the
cost of a marginal increase in downward earnings management attributable to its influence on financier
beliefs. This second term is critical to our intuition because, assuming external financing is necessary to

2

This reasoning has been used in many analytical models (Narayanan 1985; Stein 1989; and Fischer and Verrecchia

2000) as well as in motivations of empirical work (Erickson and Wang 1999; and Shivakumar 2000).
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complete the MBO, it conflicts with the incentive to manage earnings downward to reduce equity price.
Finally, the third term captures the change in the expected legal and regulatory costs of decreasing m,
which are positive if m < 0 and negative if m > 0.
If we impose the standard requirement that the equity and external financing market have rational
expectations in equilibrium, we can completely characterize an equilibrium level of earnings
^f = m
^ e = m*, and m* is optimal for the manager
management, m*. In a rational expectations equilibrium, m
^f = m
^ e = m* (i.e., equation (2) must be satisfied). Hence, it follows that m* must satisfy
given that m
^ f, m
^ e and m. Substituting in m* into equation (2) and
equation (2) after substituting in m* for all m
rearranging yields the rational expectations equilibrium m*:
m* =

–λe + λf(a)f
.
λr

(3)

In summary, then, equity market and external financing market participants anticipate that the manager
will manage earnings down by

λe – λf(a)f
. Hence, in the absence of external financing needs, f = 0,
λr

downward earnings management equals to

λe
, which is consistent with the hypothesis in prior literature.
λr

3.2 Hypotheses
A simple comparative static exercise using equation (4) yields our primary hypothesis:
dm* λf(a)
=
> 0.
df
λr

(4)

That is, when the MBO buyout group anticipates raising more external funds, managers engage in less
downward earnings management, as reflected in a higher m. Hence, we hypothesize:
H1. The level of earnings management in the earnings report issued prior to the MBO offer date is
positively associated with the amount of external financing obtained to finance the MBO.
The model yields another testable hypothesis related to external financing concerns. Consider
how changes in the amount of fixed assets that can serve as collateral, a, affect the sensitivity of the level
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dm*

of downward earnings management to changes in the level of external financing. Differentiating df with
respect to the level of fixed assets yields:
d2m* λf'(a)
=
< 0.
dfda
λr

(5)

It follows that, when the firm has more fixed assets to serve as collateral and the MBO group intends to
raise more external funds, managers perceive there is less “return” to managing earnings up to appease
the external financing market. As a consequence, the sensitivity of earnings management to an increase
in external financing is reduced. This finding forms the basis for our second testable hypotheses.
H2. The positive association between the level of earnings management prior to the MBO and the
amount of external debt financing is lower when the MBO firm has more physical assets.
We note that both the primary and secondary hypotheses hold even if we assume deviations from perfect
rational expectations, such as in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000).
One assumption in the model is that the anticipated level of external financing is fixed and that
internal sources of financing vary with differences in the acquisition price induced by differences in the
level of earnings management. If the reverse is true so that the level of internal financing is fixed at f and
the level of external financing varies, one might assert that the external financing concerns would magnify
the incentives for downward earnings management and eliminate the conflicting reporting incentive.
While the first part of the assertion is true, the second part does not follow from the first. Assuming that
the level of internal financing is fixed, we can show that (1) the level of earnings management is
negatively associated with the level of internal financing, which is intuitively equivalent to H1, and (2)
the negative relation between internal financing and level of earnings management is tempered when the
MBO firm has more physical assets, which naturally corresponds to H2. Therefore, external financing
concerns still provide a conflicting reporting incentive even if the amount of external financing changes
dollar for dollar with the equity price. What is required for the tension to exist is that (1) some level of
external financing is employed over the range of possible equity prices (P must be weakly greater than f)
and (2) the incremental cost per unit of external financing must be decreasing in the earnings report.
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3.3 Validity of critical assumptions
While the illustrative model generates testable hypotheses, we have not offered much a priori
evidence about the validity of the critical underlying assumptions. Below, we discuss more thoroughly the
three critical assumptions in the illustrative model: 1) the manager believes that neither equity market
participants nor external financing market participants observe whether accruals arise from natural
business activities or earnings management activities, 2) accruals that can be managed affect the earnings
measure employed by participants in both markets, and 3) external financiers are less responsive to
reported performance when more assets are available to secure debt.
In the context of MBOs, the extent to which the first assumption is satisfied for prospective
external financiers depends on whether these financiers are privy to a firm’s accruals decisions. One
might argue that managers will simply manage earnings down to affect the equity market and then
privately inform prospective external financiers about that earnings management. Prospective financiers,
however, would likely view such disclosures as uninformative cheap talk and, more importantly, such
disclosures would magnify shareholder litigation risks. In addition to the a priori reasoning just provided,
some anecdotal evidence suggests that external financiers are not always privy to earnings management
decisions and, as a consequence, have provided debt financing just prior to failures.3 For example, Crazy
Eddie Inc. and Crime Control Inc. were found to have manipulated their financial statements prior to
raising significant amounts of private debt just before their collapses.
With respect to the second assumption, there exists some evidence suggesting that MBO debt
financiers are likely to rely on statistics affected by accruals to predict future cash flows and make credit

3

Admittedly, these anecdotes violate our simple illustrative model because, even if the earnings management is not

observable, the assumption in our model is that the external financing market perfectly anticipates it. This violation,
however, is entirely attributable to the additional assumption in the model that the external financing market knows
the manager’s reporting objective function. If this assumption is dropped, as it is in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000),
then the external financing market will anticipate earnings management only on average.
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decisions. First, financial statement analysis texts identify statistics utilized in credit analysis that are a
function of accruals (e.g., earnings, working capital, total assets) (see, e.g., Palepu, Healy, and Bernard
2000 or White, Sondhi, and Fried 1999). Second, practitioner oriented literature provides numerous
examples of creditors employing statistics that are a function of accrual decisions. For example, Tran
(2000) asserts: “banks often won’t lend beyond a conservative multiple of earnings” (emphasis added)
(see also Osborn 1984; Kosman 1998). In addition, Eastman (1997) states that earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) is “the most popular measure of cash flow among
commercial lenders and credit analysts.”4 Although EBITDA is immune to earnings management through
interest, amortization, and tax accruals, it is still subject to earnings management through sales, cost of
sales, and other income and expense related accruals. Third, in the academic literature, Dichev and
Skinner (2002) document that the three most common ratios used in debt covenants are debt to cash flow,
earnings to interest coverage, and earnings to fixed charge coverage. They note that cash flow is often
defined in the covenants as either earnings before interest, and taxes (EBIT) or EBITDA, which implies
that these ratios are all influenced by some accrual decisions. Because these ratios are used extensively in
the debt contracts themselves, one might expect that lenders also use them in their loan authorization and
pricing decisions. Finally, a reading of the MBOs’ proxy statements reveals that the ratio of debt to
EBITDA also determines the rate that lenders charge on the loans and that some lenders require a certain
amount of cash, account receivables, and inventory as a condition to finance a transaction.5 In sum, the
evidence garnered from multiple sources suggests that it is plausible that the second condition is satisfied
and that accruals can be used to influence the decisions of external financiers.
The third assumption that external financiers lending decisions are influenced less by measures of
financial performance when the MBO firm has a greater established physical asset base also finds some

4

See also Sutherland (1988), Barker (1992), Prager and Block (1992), Hempstead (1999), Ramani (2001), or Sorkin

(2007) for discussions of examples where EITDA is employed in the context of MBO financing and valuation.
5

See, e.g., the proxy statements for the MBOs of Atrix International, Spring Industries, and Westerbeke.
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support in the literature. Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001) suggest that collateral and screening are
substitutes so that a firm with more collateral is likely to incur less intensive screening before credit is
granted. Furthermore, Inderst and Müller (2006) suggest that collateral improves a bank’s payoffs from
financing a project, thus raising the likelihood that credit will be granted at favorable terms. Accordingly,
prior empirical studies suggest that credit availability increases in the value of a firm’s assets (Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein 1994).
3.4 Suggestive evidence
The mixed results reported in extant studies on earnings management prior to MBOs leave open
the possibility that external financing concerns may be important determinants of earnings management
decisions. More specifically, DeAngelo (1986) finds no evidence of earnings management prior to MBOs
while Perry and Williams (1994) find evidence consistent with downward earnings management using a
different sample and methodology. Perry and Williams (1994), however, do not find evidence of earnings
management for firms in the DeAngelo’s sample. As Perry and Williams (1994) argue, the divergence
between their results and DeAngelo’s results appears to be attributable to the use of different sets of firms
as opposed to different methodologies. One dimension along which the two sets of firms differ may be
the extent of financing related incentives, in addition to other changes in the economic environment.
In addition to the direct tests of earnings management by DeAngelo (1986) and Perry and
Williams (1994), empirical evidence in Kaplan (1989) is consistent with managers’ reports being
influenced by external financing concerns. Specifically, Kaplan (1989) finds that firms’ profitability
following buyouts is 6 percent lower than management’s forecast at the time of the buyout. This result
suggests that, on average, some managers portray over-optimistic prospects for their firms prior to MBOs.
4. Estimated abnormal current accruals as a proxy for earnings management
Following the earnings management literature, we proxy for earnings management by measuring
a firm’s abnormal accruals. We conduct the analysis on the basis of abnormal current accruals because of
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the observation that EBITDA is commonly employed in credit decisions.6 In addition, as Healy (1985)
argues, long-term accruals, like depreciation, account for little variation in total accruals.
Using all firms that have the necessary data on Compustat, for each two-digit SIC code industry,
we estimate the following model for each year:
CAi = α0 + α1∆SALESi + α2LCAi + εit,

(6)

where CA is current accrual of firm i; ∆SALES is change in sales; LCA is the lag of CA; and ε is the
regression residual. Current accrual is defined as change in non-cash current assets (Compustat data item
4 minus Compustat data item 1) minus change in current liabilities (Compustat data item 5) plus change
in the current portion of long-term debt (Compustat data item 44). Missing values for the current portion
of long-term debt are set to zero. Both sides of the regression, including the intercept, are scaled by
beginning total assets. Each year, we delete the top and bottom 0.5 percentiles of the deflated current and
lagged CA, and observations that have beginning total assets less than ten million dollars. The model (6)
is an extension of the abnormal current accrual models used by Louis (2004), which are modifications of
the Jones (1991) model. Following prior studies, we extend the extant abnormal current accrual model by
controlling for lagged current accruals.7 The model in DeAngelo (1986), where abnormal accruals are the
change in accruals from year to year, is the special case of model 1 with α0 = α1 = 0 and α2 = 1.8

6

We recognize, however, that managers could manipulate EBITDA in manner that affects noncurrent accruals. For

example, managers could expense capital expenditures, which would decrease current-period EBITDA, futureperiod depreciation expenses, and potentially current-period depreciation expense.
7

Prior studies that model current accruals as a function of lagged accruals include Chambers (2001), Dechow,

Richardson, and Tuna (2003), Louis and White (2007), and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008).
8

The average of the 22 cross-industry average adjusted R2 for the fiscal years from 1984 to 2005 is 0.23. The cross-

industry average coefficient on change on sales (∆SALES) is positive in 21 (or 95.5%) of the 22 years. The crossindustry average coefficient on lagged total accruals (LTA) is negative in 21 (or 95.5%) of the 22 years. The
averages of the 22 cross-industry average coefficient estimates are very significant for both variables, with p-values
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We adjust our discretionary accrual measure for performance because Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney
(1995) and Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) find that estimated discretionary accruals tend to be
positively correlated with operating performance. Consistent with Louis (2004) and Gong, Louis, and Sun
(2008), among others, each year and for each industry (two-digit SIC code), we create five portfolios by
sorting the data into quintiles of return-on-assets (ROA). Discretionary current accruals are proxied by the
abnormal current accruals (ABCA). ABCA for a given firm is the unexplained current accrual (UECA)
(i.e., the residual) for that firm minus the median UECA of the matched portfolio. In addition to
controlling for performance, the portfolio-benchmarking approach controls for random effects arising
from other events that may affect accruals or other managerial incentives to manage earnings. As Kothari,
Leone, and Wasley (2005) suggest, the benchmarking approach succeeds if the differences between the
discretionary accruals of the MBO firms and those of the control portfolios effectively proxy for MBO
related earnings management.
5. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
5.1 Sample selection
The study covers completed MBOs with announcement dates between 1985 and 2005.9 The
sample is obtained from the Security Data Company (SDC)’s online database of mergers and acquisitions.
A transaction is included in the sample if: a) the target was a public company before the acquisition; b)

of 0.000. We find similar results across industries. The average of the 64 time-series average adjusted R2 is 0.24.
The time-series average coefficient on ∆SALES is positive for 52 (or 81.3%) of the 64 two-digit SIC code industries.
The time-series average coefficient on LTA is negative for 57 (or 89.1%) of the 64 industries. The averages of the 64
time-series average coefficient estimates are significant for all three variables, with p-values of 0.000. We require at
least eight observations for each estimation.
9

The sample includes one MBO (9278 Communications) that SDC mistakenly codes as pending. The bid was

actually completed; we therefore reclassify it as such. The reclassification does not qualitatively change the results.
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the acquirer is a private company; c) SDC indicates target’s management involvement in the acquisition;
d) the share of the target that the bidder acquires or attempts to acquire in the transaction is reported by
SDC (not including pre-buyout ownership); e) the acquiring firm owns (or attempts to own) 100 percent
of the target after the transaction; f) the MBO firm has necessary Compustat data; and g) the amount of
funds raised from external sources can be determined from SEC filings, description provided by SDC,
and/or news reports on Factiva. There are 200 transactions that satisfy criteria a to f. Of these transactions,
62 do not have enough available information to determine the amount of funds that were raised from
external sources. The sample selection process then yields 138 transactions.
Information on the sources of funding for the MBOs comes primarily from proxy statements filed
with the SEC. MBO firms file Schedule 14A with the SEC, where they report the amount and sources of
funding for the transactions. This information is available through the historical Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) archives on the SEC website starting in 1994. In general, a
Schedule 14A includes specific information on the total amount needed to purchase the outstanding
shares, repay existing debt, pay the MBO fees and expenses, and provide working capital. The filing also
provides the amounts of financing from various sources: contribution from management and/or the MBO
group, cash balance, and debt financing (secured, subordinated, senior, and junior). External financing is
typically the sum of the various forms of debt financing. We set external financing to zero when the filing
states that the transaction is not subject to a financing contingency because the firm and/or the acquiring
group have sufficient cash on hand. Some cases are relatively more complex, requiring some judgment.
For example, Allied Capital uses an existing unsecured credit facility to finance the acquisition of
SunSource. In this instance, the credit facility pre-dates the MBO and is granted based on the credit
capacity of Allied Capital instead of the credit capacity of SunSource. Therefore, although the transaction
is financed with debt, SunSources’ pre-MBO financial reporting has no bearing on the lender’s financing
decision. In such a case, we set external financing to zero. For transactions that do not have information
in the historical EDGAR archives (mainly prior to 1994), we rely on information provided by SDC and
news reports through Factiva to determine the amount of external funding. A comparison between the
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information on EDGAR and the information provided by SDC for those transactions that took place after
1993 shows that, in general, the information on SDC is reliable, though sometimes incomplete. If the
information on SDC is not sufficient to determine the amount of external financing, we complete it with
information provided in news reports that we obtain through Factiva.10 If we still cannot determine the
amount of external financing for a transaction, we remove the observation from the sample.
5.2 Descriptive statistics
The characteristics of the sample firms are presented in Table 1. Except for the external financing
measures and the share of the company acquired in the MBO, we winsorize the top and bottom onepercentiles (the top and bottom one or two observations) of all the variables.11 The mean (median) total
financing from external sources is about 64.2 (63.4) percent of total firm value (market value of common
equity plus the value of preferred stock (Compustat data item 130) plus total liabilities). The external
financing is high relative to total firm value because MBO firms generally need funds to purchase the
outstanding shares (usually with a substantial premium -- the average premium is 46.59%), pay off
existing debt, pay the MBO fees and expenses, and have sufficient working capital for operations. The
MBO firms also have large positive book-to-market ratios, ROA, (scaled) EBITDA, and (scaled) cash

10

Because the SEC filings generally provide more information about the source of financing than SDC and press

releases, the financing data that we collect from the filings might be more reliable than the data we obtain from SDC
and/or in press releases. To assess the potential effects of using financing data from various sources, we conduct
separate analyses for the period before and the period after 1994 (the first year when the proxy data are available in
the historical EDGAR archives). The results are consistent across the two sub-periods.
11

We do not winsorize the external financing variables and the percentage of the shares outstanding acquired in the

MBO because external financing is zero for many observations and the percentage of the shares outstanding
acquired is 100 for many observations. For these variables, winsorization would affect only one tail of the
distribution. Also, because the percentage acquired is limited at 100, this variable is unlikely to be affected by
outliers or very large data errors.
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flow from operations: with means (medians) of 0.877 (0.754), 0.144 (0.156), and 0.097 (0.100),
respectively. Consistent with the conjecture that managers deflate accruals prior to MBOs, (scaled)
current accruals are negative with a mean (median) of -0.010 (-0.007). The (scaled) change in capital
expenditures is also negative with a mean (median) of -0.008 (-0.002). The reduction in capital
expenditures is also consistent with the notion that managers have incentives to deflate reported earnings
prior to MBOs. They can recognize some capital expenditures as expenses, which would reduce both
capital expenditures and earnings. We recognize, however, that capital expenditures can also be lower if
managers delay making investments to conserve cash to finance the MBOs.
Table 1 also compares the characteristics of firms with the lowest levels of external financing to
those of firms with the highest levels of external financing. External financing is deemed low (high) if
total external financing is the bottom (top) quartile of the external financing distribution within our
sample firms. Comparing the bottom and top quartiles is likely to mitigate potential noise that might be
associated with measurement errors in computing total external financing. External financing is deflated
by total firm value.12 Because the MBO group generally has to both purchase the outstanding shares and
pay off the existing debts, we want the deflator to reflect both the MBO firm’s equity and debt.
The proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction is significantly lower for the low
external financing firms. The low external financing firms have significantly lower ROA, EBITDA, and
current accruals. They also have significantly more negative changes in capital expenditures, which is
consistent with the conjecture that the low external financing firms have stronger incentives to expense
capital expenditures. Actually, both current accruals and change in capital expenditure are negative for the
low external financing firms and positive for the high external financing firms. There is no evidence that
depreciation expenses, special items, cash flow from operations, the market reaction to the MBO
announcement, or the MBO premium are different across the two groups of firms.

12

We cannot deflate by total financing because, in general, total financing is not available prior to 1994.
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6. Earnings management prior to MBOs
Perry and Williams (1994) document that abnormal accruals are, on average, negative in the year
prior to MBOs for a sample of transactions that took place in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the 1980’s,
however, pre-MBO financial reporting incentives may have changed in a significant manner. For
example, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act in 1998, which might have mitigated managers’ concerns
about litigation associated with the pre-MBO financial reporting. Because our sample comprises a more
recent period in which reporting incentives may have differed, we first assess whether the pattern of
abnormal accruals established for the earlier sample period persists in our sample period.
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 2. Consistent with Perry and Williams (1994), we
find significantly negative abnormal current accruals in the fiscal year ending immediately prior to the
MBO announcements (Year 0). To ensure that our results capture the effects of the MBOs, we compare
the abnormal current accruals for Year 0 with the abnormal current accruals for Year-2 (the fiscal year
ending within 25 to 36 months prior to the MBO announcement). Consistent with the conjecture that the
income-decreasing abnormal current accruals are related to the MBOs, we find no evidence of incomedecreasing abnormal current accruals in Year-2.13 To assess whether the results are sensitive to the
potential effects of changes in the structure of MBO financing, we divide the sample period into two subperiods of 10 years each: 1985-1994 and 1996-2005. We do not have any sample observation in 1995.

13

We use Year-2 instead Year-1 because some managers could start planning an MBO more than a year in advance;

therefore, the observations for Year-1 could be contaminated. However, we obtain qualitatively similar results if we
use Year-1 instead of Year-2. There are 126 sample firms that have necessary data in both Year 0 and Year-1. For
these firms, the mean (median) unexpected current accruals in Year 0 are -0.024 (-0.009) and the mean (median)
abnormal current accruals are -0.026 (-0.010), with p-values below 1%. In contrast, the mean (median) unexpected
current accruals in Year-1 are -0.004 (0.007) and the mean (median) abnormal current accruals are -0.009 (0.000).
They are all statistically insignificant.
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The results for the subperiods are reported in Panel B of Table 2. We find evidence of accrual
management for both sub-periods. Although there seems to be more downward earnings management in
the later period, the difference is not statistically significant.
Table 3 provides some univariate analysis pertaining to our primary hypothesis that, on average,
firms that rely more on debt financing deflate earnings less. In Panel A, we compare the abnormal current
accruals of firms that rely the most on financing from external sources (top quartile of scaled external
financing) with abnormal current accruals of firms that rely the least on financing from external sources
(bottom quartile of scaled external financing). Consistent with H1, we find that firms that rely the most on
financing from external sources report significantly less downward abnormal current accruals than firms
that rely the least on financing from external sources.14 In Panel B, we compare the sample firms with the
Compustat population. We make the comparison across firms with no debt issuance and those in the top
decile of the distribution of debt issuance (scaled by total firm value at the beginning of the fiscal year)
using all firms on Compustat that have necessary observations.15 For the MBO firms, we use the amount
raised from external sources to finance the MBO (scaled by total firm value). Consistent with our
expectations, we find that (1) firms in the top decile of external financing report higher abnormal current
accruals across both the MBO firms and the Compustat population and (2) the MBO firms report more
negative abnormal current accruals than the population across both external financing groups.
Table 4 reports the industry distribution of the abnormal accruals by the level of external
financing. The MBOs are most concentrated in the manufacturing sector (59 out of 138 or 42.45 percent).

14

We obtain qualitatively similar results if we use the median. The one-tail p-value for the difference in the median

abnormal current accruals (unexplained current accruals) between firms that rely the most on financing from
external sources and those that rely the least on financing from external sources is 0.004 (0.005).
15

Note that the decile ranking is based on the entire Compustat population. The finer ranking (decile instead of

quartile) is necessary to ensure that the control firms have the same level of debt as the sample firms. Most of our
sample firms (101 of 138) are in the top decile of debt financing.
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Abnormal current accruals are negative in all three major industrial sectors: manufacturing,
merchandising, and services.16 Firms that rely the most on financing from external sources tend to report
less downward abnormal accruals than firms that rely the least on financing from external sources across
all the industrial groups.
7. Regression analysis
7.1 Conditional association between earnings management and external financing
We estimate the conditional association between abnormal current accruals prior to MBO
announcements and external financing using the following regression model:
ABCAi = α1SEFi + α2SPPEi + α3SEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect + εi.

(7A)

where ABCA is the abnormal current accrual for the fiscal year that immediately precedes the MBO
announcement; SEF is total financing from external sources scaled by total firm value; SPPE is beginning
net property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) scaled by total firm value; CNTR is the proportion of the
company controlled by the MBO group prior to the MBO, defined as 1 – ACQ, where ACQ is the
proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction; and BM is book value of equity divided by
market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.
We expect a positive coefficient on SEF and a negative coefficient on the interaction between
SEF and SPPE. We control for CNTR because managers’ incentives to deflate earnings prior to an MBO
is likely to decrease as the share of the company they already control increases. Gong, Louis, and Sun
(2008), for instance, find that managers’ incentives to deflate earnings prior to share repurchases increase
with the share of the company that they actually repurchase. We control for BM because the stock prices
of growth and value firms have different sensitivities to earnings and, therefore, managers of such firms

16

The sample does not include any bank because current assets and current liabilities – the two main variables used

to compute current accruals -- are not available on Compustat for banks. The sample includes five other financial
service firms; we group them into “services”.
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could have different incentives to manage earnings. We include year fixed effects to control for the
potential effects of changes in the structure of MBO financing over the years.17
The results of the regression analysis are reported in Panel A of Table 5. Consistent with the
results from the univariate analysis, we find a significantly positive association between external
financing and pre-MBO abnormal current accruals. The coefficient on the interaction between external
financing and PP&E is significantly negative, which is consistent with the conjecture that the effect of
external financing on the marginal cost of managing earnings down prior to MBOs increases when a firm
has few physical assets that it can use as collateral.
The scaled external financing measure is arguably more appropriate than the un-scaled measure
to proxy for external financing because, everything else equal, a firm that has, for instance, a value of $20
million and external financing of $18 million is more reliant on external financing than a firm that has a
value of, say, $100 million and external financing of $30 million. Therefore, external financing should be
scaled to account for the size of the firm.
On the other hand, as the total amount of external funds needed to finance the transaction
increases, so does the difficulty to secure the financing, even after considering the firm value. As Kosman
(1998) observes, there are specific difficulties associated with financing large buyouts, suggesting that unscaled external financing can be more relevant than the scaled measure in capturing the difficulty of
obtaining financing. Therefore, we also express external financing (EF) and PPE in levels. More
specifically, we use the following regression model:

17

Prior studies suggest that political costs and leverage are related to managers’ incentives to manage earnings.

Controlling for size (as a proxy for political costs) and leverage do alter our inferences. However, we do not include
these variables in our model because they are not relevant in our setting. MBO firms are relatively small and are
concerned mainly about their ability of raising the funds to finance the transaction. The effect of the financing
concern is captured by EF in our model.
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ABCAi = α1LOGEFi + α2LOGPPEi + α3LOGEFi*LOGPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi
+ Year Fixed Effect + εi,

(7B)

where LOGEF is the logarithm of EF, [log (1 + EF)] and LOGPPE is the logarithm of PPE. We use the
log transformation of these variables because their distributions are skewed. The log transformation is also
likely to mitigate potential nonlinearity and heteroskedasticity problems.18 The results, reported in Panel
B of Table 5, are consistent with the main results reported in Panel A.
To provide further evidence that the results are driven by the MBO transaction, as opposed to
some other generic predictors of accruals, we also estimate the model for the second year prior to the preMBO year. We measure ABCA over the fiscal year ending within 25 to 36 months prior to the MBO
announcement (Year-2). We also measure PPE and BM at the beginning of Year-2. The other variables,
LOGEF and CNTR are measured as in Model 7A. Because the predictions are conditioned on the
occurrence of the buyouts, we expect them to hold for the pre-MBO year (Year 0), but not for Year-2.
The results are reported in Table 6. There are 108 MBOs that have the necessary data in both Year 0 and
Year-2. Hence, in Table 6, we report the results for the 108 firms in Year 0, which replicates Table 5, and
for those same firms in Year-2. The results are generally consistent with those reported in Table 5 for
Year 0. However, none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero in Year-2, suggesting that
the documented effects are attributable to the buyouts.
7.2 Controlling for the effect of endogeneity
As was suggested in the discussion of the illustrative model, the level external financing may be
endogenous because the amount of external financing could be a function of the pre-MBO earnings
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To mitigate the potential effects of outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom one-percentiles of ABCA, LOGPPE,

and PPE/ASSET. Because the sample has only 138 observations, the winsorization affects only a few observations.
To further ensure that the results are not driven by a few observations, we use Cook’s (1977) D Influence statistics
to test for influential observations. None of the D statistics is over one; therefore, there is no evidence that the results
are driven by influential observations.
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management.19 To address the endogeneity problem, we use an instrumental variables approach. In a firststage regression, we model external financing (SEF) as a function of a set of instrumental variables and
then, in a second-stage regression, we replace SEF in Model 7A with PSEF, the predicted value of SEF
from the first-step regression. More specifically, we use the following models:
SEFi = α1ACQi + α2SCASHi + α3CAPEXi + α4LEVERAGEi + α5LAGROAi + α5LOGVALUEi
+ Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εi

(first stage)

ABCAi = α1PSEFi + α2SPPEi + α3PSEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect
+ εi,

(second stage)

where ACQ is the proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction, SCASH is cash balance
scaled by total firm value at the beginning of the year prior to the MBO announcement, CAPEX is capital
expenditures in the year prior to the MBO announcement scaled by beginning assets, LEVERAGE is total
liabilities divided by total assets at the beginning of the year prior to the MBO announcement, LAGROA
is return-on-assets for the year prior to the pre-MBO year, LOGVALUE is the logarithm of firm value, and
the industry-fixed effects are indicator variables for manufacturing, merchandising, and service firms,
respectively. The other variables are defined as before.
We include SCASH in the model because the need for external financing is likely to decrease in
the amount of cash that the firm already has on hand. We include CAPEX because firms with recent
investments in capital expenditures are probably more attractive to lenders, which would enable the firms
to raise funds more easily from external sources. We add LEVERAGE and LAGROA because a firm’s
ability to obtain external financing is likely to decrease in the amount of debt it already has and to
increase in its profitability. Finally, we include LOGVALUE because, all else equal, it is more difficult for
a firm to raise external funds to finance a large acquisition.

19

If the rational expectations assumption employed in the model is literally true, which is arguably unlikely, then this

particular endogeneity problem does not arise because, in equilibrium, the equity purchase price is independent of
the equilibrium level of earnings management.
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The results for the first-stage regression are reported in Panel A of Table 7. The model is very
powerful with an adjusted R2 of 0.855 when the industry dummies and the year-fixed effects are included
in the model and 0.443 when they are excluded. The coefficients on ACQ, CAPEX, and LAGROA are
significantly positive and the coefficients on SCASH, LEVERAGE, and LOGVALUE are significantly
negative. The results for the second-step regression are reported in Panel B of Table 7. They are
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. More specifically, the coefficients on the predicted
value of external financing (PSEF) is significantly positive, supporting the conjecture that firms that rely
more on debt financing report less negative abnormal accruals prior to MBOs. The coefficient on the
interaction between external financing and PP&E is also significantly negative, which is consistent the
conjecture that the effect of external financing on the marginal cost of managing earnings down prior to
MBOs increases when a firm has few physical assets that it can use as collateral.
8. Summary and conclusion
When managers issue financial statements, they generally have conflicting reporting incentives
because they face different user groups. One case where such a conflicting reporting incentive is likely to
arise is when managers anticipate doing an MBO. Prior studies have suggested that managers would like
to reduce equity market perceptions of the firm’s value in order to reduce the purchase price. The equity
market incentive implies that managers would manage earnings downwards in anticipation of an MBO.
We suggest that managers would also like to enhance prospective external financiers’ perceptions of the
firm’s value in order to secure financing. The incentive to appeal to financiers suggests that managers
would manage earnings upwards in anticipation of an MBO. Thus, managers face a conflicting reporting
incentive arising from financing concerns. We also conjecture that the countervailing financing incentive
should decrease with total fixed assets.
The results are consistent with the existence of the conflicting reporting incentive arising from
external financing concerns. We find that firms that use more external funds to finance their MBO report
less negative abnormal accruals. We also find that the positive effect of external financing on earnings
management decrease as the amount of fixed assets increases, which is consistent with the conjecture that
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the effect of external financing on the marginal cost of managing earnings down prior to MBOs increases
as the firm has fewer physical assets that it can use as collateral.
Our results have relevance to regulators who are concerned with equity investors being subject to
earnings management prior to MBOs and, more generally, other significant corporate events. In
particular, with respect to MBOs, our results suggest that conflicting reporting incentives mitigate the
incentives to manage earnings to take advantage of equity investors. The results also suggest that users of
financial statements should carefully assess the magnitudes of conflicting reporting incentives when
interpreting financial reports.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics
ASSET is beginning total assets (in millions of dollars); BM is book value of equity divided by market
value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year; EF, external financing, is the total amount of financing
(in millions of dollars) raised from entities that are not associated with management or the MBO group;
FIRM_VALUE is market value of common equity plus the value of preferred stock (Compustat data item
130) plus total liabilities (in millions of dollars); SEF is EF scaled by FIRM_VALUE; ACQ is the
proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction; SCASH is cash balance scaled by
FIRM_VALUE; ACQ is the proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction; SPPE is net
beginning property plant and equipment scaled by FIRM_VALUE; DEBT is total beginning long-term
debt; DEBT-TO-ASSET is the ratio of beginning long-term debt to ASSET; ROA is net income before
extraordinary items and discontinued operations scaled by ASSET; EBITDA is earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (Compustat data item 13) scaled by ASSET; CFO is cash flow from
operations scaled by ASSET; CA is current accruals scaled by ASSET; DEP is depreciation and
amortization scaled by ASSET; SI is special items scaled by ASSET; CHCAPEX is change in capital
expenditures (Compustat data item 128) scaled by ASSET; CAR is the market adjusted return over the
week centered on the MBO announcement; and PREMIUM is the offer price premium over the stock
price four weeks prior to the MBO announcement. All the variables are defined in the fiscal year prior to
the MBO announcement. External financing is deemed low (high) if total external financing (scaled by
firm value) is the bottom (top) quartile of the external financing distribution within our sample firms.
+++ ++ +
/ / indicates that the difference between “high” and “low” external financing firms is significant at
the 1%/5%/10% level in a one-tail test. The tests of mean differences are based on the t-statistic,
assuming unequal variances, and the tests for median differences are based on the Wilcoxon two-sample
statistic.
Variables
ASSET
BM
EF
FIRM_VALUE
SEF
SCASH
ACQ
SPPE
DEBT-TO-ASSET
ROA
EBITDA
CFO
CA
DEP
SI
CHCAPEX
CAR
PREMIUM

N
138
138
138
138
138
138
138
138
138
138
137
137
138
137
134
138
115
112

Full sample
Mean Median
235.334 93.114
0.877
0.754
196.696 63.150
302.211 118.947
0.642
0.634
0.135
0.044
82.738 100.000
0.310
0.258
0.237
0.212
0.030
0.047
0.144
0.156
0.097
0.100
-0.010 -0.007
0.054
0.046
-0.004
0.000
-0.008 -0.002
24.893 22.700
46.587 44.070

Low external financing
N
Mean Median
34 174.659
67.541
34
0.788
0.806
34
30.947
0.000
34 208.581
66.359
34
0.084
0.000
34
0.254
0.110
34
68.246
63.455
34
0.254
0.180
34
0.281
0.139
34
-0.058
0.008
33
0.064
0.079
33
0.074
0.076
34
-0.068
-0.044
33
0.057
0.042
33
-0.018
0.000
34
-0.019
-0.010
27
28.945
24.510
28
48.506
50.300

High external financing
N
Mean
Median
34
150.835
67.854
34
0.756
0.578
+++
34 224.854
139.000+++
34
218.481
113.107
+++
34
1.204
1.218+++
+++
34
0.073
0.042+++
+++
34 98.650
100.000+++
34
0.315
0.276
34
0.216
0.188
+++
34
0.068
0.063+++
+++
34
0.201
0.191+++
34
0.087
0.097
34
0.038+++
0.011+++
34
0.058
0.053
34
-0.007
0.000
34
0.006++
0.002++
30
23.592
27.205
28
45.016
46.420

31

Table 2
Abnormal current accruals prior to MBOs
Discretionary current accrual is proxied by the difference between the abnormal current accrual (ABCA)
of a firm and the median abnormal current accrual of a portfolio matched on industry and performance.
We refer to the difference as the matched ABCA. The (unmatched) ABCA is the residual of the following
regression: CAi = α0 + α1∆SALESit + α2LCAit + εit, where CA is current accrual; ∆SALES is change in
sales; LCA in the lag of CA; and ε is the regression residual. Both sides of the regression are scaled by
beginning total assets. The regression is estimated by year and (two-digit SIC code) industry, using all
firm-years that have the necessary observations on Compustat. Year 0 refers to the fiscal year ending
within 1 to 12 months prior to the MBO announcement and Year-2 refers to the fiscal year ending within
25 to 36 months prior to the MBO announcement. In Panel A, we use two sets of firms. In the first set, we
require that a firm have necessary data in Year 0 only; the number of observations is 138. In the second
set, we require that a firm have necessary data in both Year 0 and Year-2; the number of observations is
108. In Panel B, we report results for the first set only. One-tail p-values are presented in brackets and
two-tail p-values in parentheses. They are based on the t-test for the mean and the Wilcoxon signed rank
test for the median. We winsorize the top and bottom observations of the discretionary current accrual
measures.
Panel A: Abnormal current accruals in Year 0 and Year-2 for the full sample
Year 0 (Full sample)
(N = 138)
Unmatched
Matched
ABCA
ABCA
Mean
Median

-0.021
[0.001]
-0.009
[0.001]

-0.023
[0.001]
-0.010
[0.001]

Year 0 (Restricted
sample)
(N
Unmatched= 108)
Matched
ABCA
ABCA
-0.019
[0.007]
-0.009
[0.007]

-0.021
[0.003]
-0.007
[0.004]

Year-2 (Restricted sample)
(N = 108)
Unmatched
Matched
ABCA
ABCA
-0.002
(0.756)
0.004
(0.681)

-0.003
(0.655)
0.008
(0.652)

Panel B: Abnormal current accruals in Year 0: Earlier versus later years
1985-1994
(N = 63)
Unmatched ABCA
Matched ABCA
Mean
Median

-0.013
[0.060]
-0.009
[0.017]

-0.013
[0.053]
-0.007
[0.012]

1996-2005
(N = 75)
Unmatched ABCA
Matched ABCA
-0.028
[0.005]
-0.008
[0.020]

-0.030
[0.002]
-0.014
[0.007]
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Table 3
Average abnormal current accruals in the year immediately prior to the MBO announcement by the level
of external financing
In Panel A, external financing is deemed low (high) if total external financing (scaled by total firm value
at the beginning of the fiscal period) is the bottom (top) quartile of the external financing distribution
within the sample firms. The two sub-periods are: 1985-1994 and 1996 – 2005. The sample has no
observation in 1995. In Panel B, the top decile of external financing is based on the distribution of debt
issuance (scaled by total value of the firm at the beginning of the fiscal period) for all the firms on
Compustat that have necessary observations. For the MBO firms, external financing (SEF) is the amount
raised from external sources to finance the MBO (scaled by total firm value at the beginning of the fiscal
period). Discretionary accrual is as defined in Table 2. It is measured in the year prior to the debt
issuance. One-tail p-values are presented in brackets and two-tail p-values in parentheses.
Panel A: Full sample and cross-period comparison
Level of external financing
Full sample
Unmatched ABCA
Matched ABCA
Earlier years: 1985-1994
Unmatched ABCA
Matched ABCA
Later years: 1996-2005
Unmatched ABCA
Matched ABCA

Difference

Low
(N = 34)
-0.051
[0.000]
-0.049
[0.001]
Low
(N = 15)
-0.029
[0.038]
-0.033
[0.032]

Medium
(N = 70)
-0.023
[0.011]
-0.025
[0.005]
Medium
(N = 32)
-0.023
[0.026]
-0.022
[0.028]

High
(N = 34)
0.013
(0.317)
0.009
(0.456)
High
(N = 16)
0.023
(0.175)
0.023
(0.135)

Low
(N = 18)
-0.070
[0.002]
-0.063
[0.006]

Medium
(N = 38)
-0.022
[0.008]
-0.027
[0.031]

High
(N = 19)
0.000
(0.985)
-0.005
(0.800)

High – Low
0.064
[0.000]
0.058
[0.001]
High – Low
0.052
[0.008]
0.056
[0.013]
High – Low
0.071
[0.010]
0.058
[0.027]

Panel B: MBO firms versus Compustat population
No external financing
N

Unmatched Matched
ABCA
ABCA

Top decile of external financing
N

SEF Unmatched Matched
ABCA
ABCA

Difference
Unmatched Matched
ABCA
ABCA

MBO firms

19

-0.080
[0.009]

-0.075
[0.002]

101 0.844

-0.009
[0.116]

-0.012
[0.049]

0.071
[0.002]

0.062
[0.007]

Compustat
population

35,683

-0.002
(0.000)

0.000
(0.826)

4,966 0.822

0.003
(0.015)

0.005
(0.001)

0.005
[0.000]

0.004
[0.002]

-0.078
[0.001]

-0.075
[0.001]

-0.022
(0.509
)

-0.012
[0.058]

-0.017
[0.013]

Difference
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Table 4
Average abnormal current accruals in the year immediately prior to the MBO announcement by industry
and level of external financing
External financing is deemed low (high) if total external financing (scaled by total firm value at the
beginning of the fiscal period) is the bottom (top) quartile of the external financing distribution. We do
not report results for the middle quartiles. Discretionary accrual is as defined in Table 2. The number of
observations is reported in brackets. ++/+ indicate that the difference between the high external financing
group and the low external financing group is significant at the 5%/10% level in a one-tail test.
Industrial sector
(Two-digit SIC code)

Full
Sample
Unmatched Matched
ABCA
ABCA

Low
external financing
Unmatched Matched
ABCA
ABCA

High
external financing
Unmatched Matched
ABCA
ABCA

Manufacturing
(20-39)

-0.027
{59}

-0.029
{59}

-0.051
{12}

-0.056
{12}

-0.008+
{12}

-0.008++
{12}

Merchandising
(50-59)

-0.013
{33}

-0.016
{33}

-0.044
{5}

-0.055
{5}

0.011
{11}

0.007
{11}

Services
(48, 49, 60-67, 70-87)

-0.023
{41}

-0.022
{41}

-0.053
{16}

-0.041
{16}

0.034++
{10}

0.023++
{10}

Other industries
(13, 17, 40, 42, 45)

0.001
{5}

0.004
{5}

-0.061
{1}

-0.055
{1}

0.071
{1}

0.097
{1}

34

Table 5
Association between external financing and abnormal current accruals measured in the year immediately
preceding the MBO year: Ordinary least square (N = 138)
ABCAi = α1SEFi + α2SPPEi + α3SEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect + εi.

(Panel A)

ABCAi = α1LOGEFi + α2LOGPPEi + α3LOGEFi*LOGPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi
+ Year Fixed Effect + εi,

(Panel B)

ABCA is the abnormal current accrual for the fiscal year the immediately precede the MBO
announcement; SEF is total financing from external sources, which is scaled by total firm value in Panal
A and is unscaled in Panal B; SPPE is the net beginning of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) scaled
by total firm value; CNTR is the proportion of the company controlled by the MBO group prior to the
MBO [1 – ACQ]; ACQ is the proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction; BM is book
value of equity divided by market value of equity at the beginning of the fiscal year; and the subscript i
stands for MBO i. Unexpected current accruals and abnormal current accruals are as defined in Table 2.
Two-tail p-values are reported in parentheses and one-tail p-values are reported in brackets.
Panel A: External financing is scaled

SEF
SPPE
SEF*SPPE
CNTR
BM
Year fixed effects
Adjusted R2

ABCA = Unmatched abnormal current
accruals
0.113
[0.000]
0.177
(0.001)
-0.195
[0.002]
0.031
[0.159]
-0.012
[0.078]
Yes
0.253

ABCA = Matched abnormal current
accruals
0.112
[0.000]
0.187
(0.000)
-0.212
[0.001]
0.030
[0.160]
-0.015
[0.033]
Yes
0.254

Panel B: External financing is unscaled
ABCA = Unmatched abnormal current
accruals
LOGEF
0.025
[0.001]
LOGPPE
0.016
(0.107)
LOGEF*LOGPP
-0.004
[0.016]
CNTR
0.019
[0.272]
BM
-0.001
[0.456]
Year Fixed Effect
Yes
2
0.201
Adjusted R

ABCA = Matched abnormal current
accruals
0.024
[0.003]
0.016
(0.109)
-0.004
[0.019]
0.019
[0.265]
-0.004
[0.296]
Yes
0.188
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Table 6
Association between external financing and abnormal current accruals: The first year prior to the MBO
(Year 0) versus the second year prior to the MBO (Year-2): Ordinary least square (N = 108)
ABCAi = α1SEFi + α2SPPEi + α3SEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect + εi.
In Year 0, we measure all the variables over fiscal year ending within 1 to 12 months prior to the MBO
announcement and, in Year-2, we measure all the variables over fiscal year ending within 25 to 36
months prior to the MBO announcement. We require that a firm have necessary observations in both Year
0 and Year-2. The variables are defined in Tables 2 and 5. Two-tail p-values are reported in parentheses
and one-tail p-values are reported in brackets. We do not report the year intercepts.
Coefficient

SEF
SPPE
SEF*SPPE
CNTR
BM
Year fixed effects
Adjusted R2

ABCA = Unmatched abnormal
current accruals

ABCA = Matched abnormal current
accruals

Year 0

Year-2

Year 0

Year-2

0.100
[0.007]
0.154
(0.010)
-0.179
[0.016]
-0.009
[0.591]
-0.010
[0.136]
Yes
0.153

-0.004
(0.916)
0.010
(0.882)
-0.056
(0.485)
-0.045
(0.275)
-0.010
(0.600)
Yes
0.048

0.128
[0.001]
0.193
(0.002)
-0.239
[0.003]
-0.005
[0.550]
-0.016
[0.040]
Yes
0.222

-0.002
(0.958)
0.021
(0.740)
-0.071
(0.378)
-0.038
(0.357)
-0.009
(0.658)
Yes
0.035
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Table 7
Effect of external financing on abnormal current accruals measured in the year immediately preceding the
MBO year: Two-stage least square (N = 138)
SEFi = α1ACQi + α2SCASHi + α3CAPEXi + α4LEVERAGEi + α5LAGROAi + α5LOGVALUEi
+ Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + εi
(first stage)
ABCAi = α1PSEFi + α2SPPEi + α3PSEFi*SPPEi + α4CNTRi + α5BMi + Year Fixed Effect
+ εi
(second stage)
ACQ is the proportion of the company acquired in the MBO transaction, SCASH is cash balance scaled by
total firm value at the beginning of the year prior to the MBO announcement, CAPEX is capital
expenditures in the year prior to the MBO announcement scaled by beginning assets, LEVERAGE is total
liabilities divided by total assets at the beginning of the year prior to the MBO announcement, LAGROA
is return-on-assets for the year prior to the pre-MBO year, LOGVALUE is the logarithm of the firm value;
and PSEF is the predicted value of SEF from the first-step regression. The other variables are defined as
in Tables 2 and 5. Two-tail p-values are reported in parentheses and one-tail p-values are reported in
brackets. We do not report the year intercepts.
Panel A: First-stage regression
ACQ SCASH CAPEX LEVERAGE LAGROA LOGVALUE Fixed Effects
Coefficient
0.650 -0.346
One-tail p-value 0.000 0.010

1.003
0.010

-0.317
0.008

0.613
0.013

-0.038
0.052

Yes

Adj. R2
0.855

Panel B: Second-stage regression

PSEF
SPPE
PSEF*SPPE
CNTR
BM
Year Fixed Effect
Adjusted R2

ABCA = Unmatched abnormal current
accruals

ABCA = Matched abnormal current
accruals

0.139
[0.002]
0.170
(0.016)
-0.190
[0.023]
0.048
[0.115]
-0.015
[0.043]
Yes
0.213

0.126
[0.004]
0.154
(0.027)
-0.168
[0.037]
0.046
[0.122]
-0.017
[0.024]
Yes
0.198

